It is shown by example that learning rules of the fictitious play type fail to converge in certain kinds of coordination games. Variants of fictitious play in which past actions are eventually forgotten and that incorporate small stochastic perturbations are better behaved for this class of games: over the long run, players coordinate with probability one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72. ᮊ 1998 Academic Press
INTRODUCTION
Although it is well known that fictitious play does not converge to a Ž . Nash equilibrium in general Shapley, 1964 , fictitious play does converge for quite a few games having economic significance. These include zero-sum Ž . Ž . games Robinson, 1951 , two-person two-strategy games Miyasawa, 1961 , Ž . dominance solvable games Milgrom and Roberts, 1991 , two-person games Ž . with strategic complementarities and diminishing returns Krishna, 1992 , Ž . potential games Monderer and Shapley, 1996b , and games with identical Ž . interests Monderer and Shapley, 1996a . One might hope that fictitious play also works for coordination games. The reason is that coordination games have a natural positive reinforcement property: in a neighborhood of every coordination equilibrium, every best-reply path gravitates toward the equilibrium, whereas in a neighborhood of any mixed equilibrium, there is a best-reply path leading away from the equilibrium. We shall show by example, however, that this is not sufficientᎏeven in a coordination game, fictitious play can still get trapped in cyclic behavior that is far from equilibrium.
A finite, two-person game G is a coordination game if the players have the same number of strategies, which can be indexed so that it is always a strict Nash equilibrium for both players to play strategies having the same Ž . index. Thus the payoff matrix has the form ⌸ s a , b , where 1 F i F n, time t. The sequence S is a fictitious play sequence if there is some t G 1 Ž .
X X such that for every tЈ ) t, i is a best reply to q S , and j is a best t t y1 t Ј
Ž .
X reply to p S . The game G has the fictitious play property if every limit t y1 Ž point of every fictitious play sequence is a Nash equilibrium pure or . mixed of G. In the next two sections we exhibit coordination games that do not have the fictitious play property.
THE DOCTRINES GAME
Two groups of academics periodically announce a position on some matter of scholarly doctrine. There are three basic doctrines, A, B, and C. Each doctrine has two variants: A X and A Y , B X and B Y , C X and C Y . Both groups would like to coordinate on the same version of the same doctrine. A squabble is a situation in which the groups choose different versions of the same doctrine. The payoffs are set up so that once a squabble begins, the two groups keep shifting position in a way that generates a new squabble. Specifically, although both players would rather coordinate on BЈ or on BЉ than get into an A-squabble, Row prefers BЈ to BЉ, whereas Column prefers BЉ to BЈ. This generates a B-squabble. Both prefer CЈ and CЉ to a B-squabble, but Row prefers CЈ to CЉ, whereas Column prefers CЉ to CЈ, which generates a C-squabble. In short, once the academics disagree on the fine points of doctrine, they are unable to reach an agreement on the main points. This situation can be represented by the payoff matrix shown in Table I .
The strategies DЈ and DЉ serve solely as tie-breaking devices; the main action is on the remaining six strategies. Consider a fictitious play sequence that begins with Row choosing DЈ and Column choosing DЉ. In the Given the initial choices DЈ and DЉ, Row has a slight preference for prime over double prime, whereas Column prefers the reverse. This leads the players to coordinate on the same basic doctrine, but never on the same version of that doctrine. Once involved in a squabble, each tries to rectify the situation by imitating what the other did in the previous period, which leads to a new squabble. Thus the process cycles endlessly. THEOREM 1. The doctrines game does not ha¨e the fictitious play property.
Proof. Let t be the number of periods in squabble k. The first three k squabbles are of length t s 2, t s 14, and t s 74. In general, the 1 2 3 numbers t satisfy the following recursive equation:
From this it follows that each squabble is about five times as long as the previous one. Hence the empirical frequency distribution of strategies Ž . p , q never converges. A fortiori, it does not converge to an equilibrium.
Ž
. equilibrium. Suppose that p*, q* is a limit point. Then there exist ␣, ␤, ␥ such that
For this to be a Nash equilibrium, we must have ␣ s ␤ s ␥. This is not the case, however, because at least one pair of these numbers must be in the ratio of about 5 to 1. Ž . To prove 1 we proceed by induction on k. For k s 1 the result follows by plugging in the values t s 2, t s 14, and t s 74. Suppose then that 1 2 3 k ) 1. Since the game is symmetric in A, B, C, and the squabbling proceeds in the cycle A ª B ª C ª A, there is no loss of generality in Ž . Ž . assuming that the k q 2 nd is an A-squabble, the k q 1 st is a C-squabble, and the kth is a B-squabble. To determine which strategy is a best response by Row at any given time t, it suffices to compute the hypotheti-Ž . cal total payoff to Row of each strategy, assuming it is played against all previous choices by Column up through time t y 1. Call this the score of the strategy at time t. Fictitious play stipulates that in each period, Row chooses some strategy with the highest score.
Ž . Consider the k q 2 nd squabble, which by assumption is an A-squabble. Each time that Column plays AЈAЉ in succession, both A-strategies for Row increase their score by 24 q 6 s 30, both B-strategies increase their score by 18 q 18 s 36, and both C-strategies increase their score by zero. Thus BЈ gains 6 points relative to AЈ in every two successive periods of an A-squabble.
Let S X and S X be the scores of AЈ and BЈ at the beginning of the 
their scores are S and S , then we have 0 -S y S -6. This is A B B A because they start period 3 with a difference that is less than 6, and all . subsequent actions change the scores by multiples of 6. During the ensuing B-squabble, which lasts for t periods, AЈ increases its score by 0, k BЈ increases its score by 30t r2, and CЈ increases its score by 36t r2. After 
Ž . We may assume by induction that t and t are even. From 2 it follows
We also know that y5 F S y S F y1. Hence A B X X S y S r6 s 6 t r2 y 5t r2,
Ž .
A B kq1 k and therefore,
Hence t is even and formula 1 holds for k, from which it follows by kq 2 Ž . induction that 1 holds for all k. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
We remark that this serves as a counterexample to various other conjectures that one might entertain about fictitious play. Consider any Ž . finite, two-person game G with strategy sets X and Y. A one-sided best
reply path is a sequence of pairs x , y , x , y , . . . , x , y such that x iq1 is a best reply to x i , or y iq1 is a best reply to y i for 1 F i -k. G is acyclic if no best reply path forms a cycle. Since every coordination game is acyclic, Theorem 1 shows that acyclic games need not have the fictitious play property.
THE MERRY-GO-ROUND GAME
The doctrines game is somewhat delicate, because just a slight perturbation of the payoffs would cause the example to fail. Moreover, even if the payoffs are as given, it only takes one deviation by one player for the Ž process to get onto a path leading to coordination. If the players manage to coordinate once in the midst of a squabble, the squabble will be broken . and they will coordinate in all subsequent periods. The question therefore arises whether there are coordination games in which fictitious play fails to converge in a more robust sense.
Consider the following situation. Rick and Cathy are in love, but they are not allowed to communicate. Once a day, at an appointed time, they can take a ride on a merry-go-round. The merry-go-round has m pairs of horses, where m is odd. Before taking a ride, each of them chooses one of the m pairs without communicating their choice to the other. There are no other riders. If they book the same pair they get to ride side-by-side, which is their preferred outcome. If they choose different pairs, their payoffs depend on how conveniently they can look at each other. The merry-goround operates clockwise, as shown in Fig. 1 .
If Rick chooses pair 1 and Cathy chooses 2, for example, then Rick can see Cathy, but she cannot easily see him, because the horses all face in the clockwise direction. Say this outcome has payoff 4 for Rick and 0 for Cathy. If they sit side by side they can look at each other to their hearts' Ž . content but not talk ; this has a payoff of 6. If they are on opposite sides of the circle, they can both see each other easily, but the one who has to Ž . crane his neck less has a slightly higher payoff 5 compared to 4 .
More generally, define the merry-go-round game with m s 2 k q 1 positions as follows: the payoff from coordinating is 6 for both players, the Ž payoff from being 1 to k y 1 positions ahead of the other going in the . clockwise direction is 0, the payoff from being k positions ahead is 4, the payoff from being k q 1 positions ahead is 5, and the payoff from being k q 2 to 2k positions ahead is 4. The general structure of this game is that coordinating yields only slightly higher payoffs than being on opposite sides of the circle; moreover, a slight miscoordination causes a large loss in payoff to one of the parties.
We shall now show that the merry-go-round game with these payoffs Ž . Ž does not have the fictitious play property FPP . Moreover unlike the . doctrines game , it is robust in the sense that every sufficiently small perturbation of the payoffs results in a game without the FPP, too. 
THEOREM 2. Whene¨er the number of positions is odd and at least nine, the merry-go-round game and all sufficiently small perturbations of it do not ha¨e the fictitious play property.
Proof. We need to show that for every number of positions m s 2 k q 1 G 9, and every sufficiently small perturbation of the payoffs, there exists an initial sequence of plays such that fictitious play from that point on Ž . generates empirical distributions p , q , none of whose limit points are t t close to any Nash equilibrium of the game. Throughout most of the proof we shall use the exact payoffs in Table II . At the conclusion we shall show that the result also holds when the payoffs are perturbed slightly. Each pair of horses will be called a position. Proceeding clockwise, Ž . number the positions 1, 2, . . . , m, where m s 2 k q 1 is odd. Rick R is Ž . the row player and Cathy C is the column player. Let the process begin in period 1 with R in position 1 and C in position k q 1. We are going to create a sequence of moves of the following form: after a certain number of periods t , C moves to position k q 2. After t more periods, R moves 1 2 to position 2. After t more periods, C moves to position k q 3, and so 3 forth. In other words, R and C alternate in moving clockwise around the TABLE II Best-Reply Cycle in the Merry-Go-Round Game circle, with C always k or k q 1 steps ''ahead'' of R. Such a sequence is called a chase. The payoffs from a chase are fairly good, because both parties can see each other without craning their necks too much. But both would be better off if they sat side by side. We shall demonstrate the Ž . existence of an initial chase not necessarily generated by fictitious play , such that in every subsequent period, fictitious play continues the chase ad infinitum.
Let the initial chase be represented by the sequence t , t , . . . , t , . . . ,
where t is the number of consecutive periods that the process spent in a j situation in which neither R nor C moved. We shall call this stage j of the chase. Assume that when j is even, R will be the next to move, whereas when j is odd, C will be the next to move. A cycle is a sequence of 2 m stages that takes the players once around the circle. Let us focus on some stage j, which, without loss of generality, we can suppose is even. Assume that we are in the last period of the current stage. In the next period, R will move clockwise one step and stay there for t jq1 periods. For this move to be generated by fictitious play, it must be R's best reply to the history. To compute the best reply, refer to Table II , which shows the last 18 stages of the most recent cycle within the payoff matrix for the case m s 9.
Let us adopt the tie-breaking convention that a player moves one position clockwise as soon as that position has a payoff equal to or higher Ž than that of his current position. This assumption is for bookkeeping . purposes only; the example works for any tie-breaking rule. Thus, in the above cycle, R moves as soon as the second row has at least as high an expected payoff as the first row, that is, as soon as
where involves all terms t and earlier. This is equivalent to
In the period just before this one, R did not move clockwise, so the above expression with t y 1 substituted for t must be less than zero. It follows Observe that T s t q иии qt periods ago, R was faced with the same
choice that he is now, and he moved. Therefore, T periods ago, the payoff j difference between staying put and moving must have been exactly equal to zero, which implies that s 0. We conclude that, if fictitious play has generated a chase for the last t q иии qt periods, then the following
Ž .
jy2 ky2 jy2 mq3 jy2 mq2 jy2 mq1
In preparation for proving Theorem 2, we shall now establish various inequalities among the t . Indeed, we shall show that these inequalities j hold for general real numbers t , not just integers. This fact will be useful 
Ž .
Ž . 
jy2 ky2 jy2 mq3 jy2 mq2 jy2 mq1 и и и 6 0 y4 y4 y1 .
Ž . Ž .
Assume that 5 and 6 hold for all i in the interval j y 2 m y 1 F i F Ž . j y 1. Since m G 9, t is at least four stages ahead of t , so 5 jy2 jy2 kq1
Ž . implies that t ) 4 t . By 6 , t ) t , and hence
By the inductive assumption, the positive terms 6 t q 6 t strictly jy2 ky1 jy2 ky2
outweigh the negative terms y4t y 4 t y t . Putting all jy2 mq3 jy2 mq2 jy2 mq1
Ž . of this together, we conclude that t ) t , so that 6 holds for i s j.
Next we shall show that t ) 2 t . By hypothesis, the recursive equation
Ž . 4 holds for j y 1 as well as j. Adding the resulting two equations, we obtain j jy 1 j y 2 j y 3 иии j y 2 k q 1 j y 2 k jy 2 k y 1 0 s y1
j y 2 k y 2 j y 2 k y 3 иии j y 2 m q 3 j y 2 m q 2 j y 2 m q 1 j y 2 m 6 0 иии y4 y4 y1 0 6 6 иии 0 y4 y4 y1 12 6 иии y4 y8 y5 y1 8 Ž .
Ž . Ž . By assumption, Eq. 4 holds for j y 3 and j y 4, hence the analog to 8 holds for j y 3. Adding these equations for j and j y 3, we obtain Ž .
Ž . Ž . From the assumption that 5 and 6 hold inductively, it follows that the sum of the terms in A is nonnegative. Similarly, the sum of the terms in B is nonnegative. Hence t ) 2 t , as claimed.
Ž . Finally, we need to show that t -4 t . From Eq. 8 subtract twice the Ž . Using 5 and 6 , it is straightforward to show that the sum of the terms in A is negative, and that the sum of the terms in B is negative. It follows that yt q 4 t ) 0, which completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 shows that if a strictly positive sequence t , t , . . . , t , . . . is 1 2 j Ž . generated by Eq. 4 from some point j G 2 m on, and if the initial Ž . Ž . sequence satisfies 5 and 6 , then the whole sequence has these two properties.
Next we need to establish that for a suitably chosen initial sequence t , t , . . . , t , fictitious play generates all subsequent stages t according to 1 2 j j Ž . the recursive equation 4 . This will follow if, whenever a player moves under fictitious play, he always moves one step clockwise. This happens if the one-step-clockwise position has an expected payoff the same as or Ž higher than that of any other position including the player's current . position . In particular, we need to show that coordinating with the other player's most recent move offers a strictly lower payoff than staying put or moving one step clockwise. From this it follows that all other positions offer strictly lower payoffs compared to staying put or moving one step clockwise.
Ž . Coordination has the highest payoff relative to other strategies when some player has occupied the same position for a long time, since this Ž . creates the strongest incentive for the other player to imitate him or her . Thus the crucial point to check is the attractiveness of coordination when some player has just completed two stages in the same position. Without loss of generality, consider the situation at the end of an even stage j: R has occupied the same position for t q t periods, and is about to move.
Ž . This is the situation depicted in Table II 
Ž .
jy2 ky3 jy2 ky4 jy2 mq3 jy2 mq2 jy2 mq1 и и и y5 y4 y4 y4 0 0
Note that we are omitting all stages older than the last complete cycle. This is sufficient, because if the inequality holds now, and it held 2 m stages ago, 2 m stages before that, and so forth, then it must hold now with all previous stages included. In particular, if a sequence satisfies the Ž . Ž . recursive equation 4 and inequality 10 for all jЈ such that j G jЈ G 2 m, then from stage j on, fictitious play will generate precisely this sequence.
Ž . LEMMA 2. Suppose that inequalities 5 and 6 hold for all i in the Ž . Ž . inter¨al j y 2 m y 1 F i F j, and 4 holds for j and j y 1. Then 10 holds for j.
Proof. By assumption, the recursive equation holds for j and j y 1.
Ž . Combining these with inequality 10 results in the equivalent inequality shown below: Ž .
We shall show that the last row is positive, from which it will follow Ž . that the first row is positive, that is, inequality 10 holds for j. To prove that the last row is positive, we need to show that each of the negative terms in the bottom row is dominated by some combination of positive terms to the left. We shall refer to these terms by the values of their Ž . coefficients. By property 5 , the y23 term is dominated by the 8 term, which is two periods ahead, plus the 4 term, which is four periods ahead. The y17 is dominated by the 6, which is four periods ahead. The first y4 is dominated by the first 2. Each subsequent y4 in the second ellipsis is dominated by the corresponding 4 in the first ellipsis. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
We shall now demonstrate an initial sequence of integers that gets the Ž cycle started. For the sake of concreteness, fix m s 9. The construction . generalizes easily to any odd m ) 9. Fix any pair of positions on the circle in which C is 4 steps ahead of R going clockwise. Consider a chase with stage lengths generated by the following equations: 
t s t q t q 0 t q 0 t q 0 t q 0 t 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 t s t q t q 0 t q 0 t q 0 t q 0 t y 2 t 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 t s t q t q 0 t q 0 t q 0 t q 0 t y 2 t y 2 t 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 иии t s t q t q 0 t q 0 t q 0 t q 0 t y 2 t y 2 t q 6 t q 6 t 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 q 0 t q 0 t q 0 t q 0 t y 4 t y 4 t y t 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Ž . Notice that t is generated by the recursive equation 4 , and that the 18 preceding terms are generated by truncating the recursive equation. Generate the next four terms t , t , t , t by the recursive equation as well. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 32, 47, 75, 130, 209, 345, 564, 929, 1535, 2526, 4104, 6650, 10821, 17598, 28613 .
Ž . Observe that this sequence satisfies conditions 5 and 6 . Since the last five terms were generated by the recursive equation, the sequence satisfies the hypotheses of Lemmas 1 and 2. Now let fictitious play start in period T s t q t q иии qt q 1. On one 1 2 2 2 Ž . hand, Lemma 2 implies that inequality 10 holds for j s 22, so C does not have an incentive to move in the current period T. On the other hand, R is indifferent between staying put and moving one step clockwise. The reason is this: since t satisfies the recursive equation, R would be indifferent 22 between moving and not moving if he reacted only to the last 18 stages. Moreover, 18 stages ago, R was indifferent between staying put and moving one step clockwise, because by construction, t satisfies the trun-4 cated version of the recursive equation. Therefore R is indifferent now if Ž . he reacts to all previous stages which he does under fictitious play . Because of the tie-breaking rule, he actually does move, which begins the 23rd stage. After this, neither player has an incentive to move until C becomes indifferent between the next step clockwise and her current Ž . position. This happens when t satisfies the recursive equation 4 . This 23 process repeats itself, and generates an infinite chase.
Ž . Now consider the empirical distributions p , q generated by the chase.
Ž . Because of 5 and 6 , any limit point of the process has stage lengths that are monotonic and more than double in length every two stages. It is clear Ž that such a point cannot be close to a Nash equilibrium of the game. See Ž . Krishna and Sjostrom 1997 for a discussion of conditions under whicḧ . continuous-time fictitious play converges to a mixed Nash equilibrium.
It remains to be shown that the example is robust, that is, nonconvergence still holds when we perturb the payoffs slightly. To prove this, we need to modify the preceding argument in certain details. Let U denote the vector of payoffs in the merry-go-round game, where we view U as a 2= 2 m=2 m Ž U . vector in R . Let t denote the infinite sequence of integers Ž .
Ž . generated as in 12 , and thereafter by recursive equation 4 , using the unperturbed payoffs. Note also that if we begin the sequence with t s n 1 and t s 2 n for some positive integer n, then the same process generates 2 Ž U . the sequence nt . Now let denote a slight perturbation of the payoff vector U . Consider a restricted version of fictitious play in which each player either moves clockwise one position or stays put, depending on which has the Ž higher payoff. In other words, a player is not allowed to move to other . positions, even though they might have a higher payoff. Given any positive Ž . integer n, let t , n denote the sequence of stages generated by this restricted FP process when the first two terms are t s n and t s 2 n. . . . , into the jth perturbed recursive equation, where the perturbed coefficients are derived from , and solve for the left-hand side t in reals.
Then t , n y t -1, that is, t , n is an integer that is close to the j j j real number t that exactly equates the payoffs of the current position and j the next clockwise position of the player who is about to move. We can write this as
If is sufficiently close to U , and n is sufficiently large, the sequence Ä X Ž . 4 t , n : 1 F j F 22 can be made as close as we like to the sequence
The latter sequence satisfies 5 and 6 , which are j strict inequalities; hence we can choose and n so that the former sequence satisfies these strict inequalities also. Therefore these inequali-Ä Ž . 4 ties also hold for the unnormalized sequence t , n : 1 F j F 22 . Ž . that whenever y -␦ and n ) n , properties 5 and 6 hold for Ä X Ž . 4 the whole sequence t , n : 1 F j F ϱ . This follows from the initial j conditions and Lemma 1 when s U and n s 1. To show it more generally, we begin by observing that, in the base case s U and n s 1, Ž . Ž . the inequalities 5 and 6 hold with room to spare. Indeed, consider any Ä 4 Ž . real-valued sequence t : j G i G j y 2 m y 4 such that properties 5 and i Ž . 6 hold and the terms t , t , t , t , t are generated by the j jy1 jy2 jy3 jy4
Ž . recursive equation 4 . We claim that there exists ) 0 such that
This follows from the observation that t is the smallest term involved jy22 in any of the inequalities or equalities used in proving Lemma 1; more-Ž . over, the proof shows that there is slack in establishing inequalities 5 and Ž . 6 that is bounded below by this smallest term times a positive constant Ž that depends on the coefficients in the recursive equation which depend U . on . Ä 4 Ž . Ž . Now consider any sequence t : j G i G j y 22 such that 5 and 6 i hold for j y 22 F i -j and such that the terms t , t , t , t , t are
Ž . generated by 14 , which is the perturbed version of the recursive equation.
Ž . Ž . The upper bound in 5 , together with monotonicity 6 , imply that t - there exists ␦ ) 0 and n such that, whenever y -␦ and n ) n Ä 4 and the sequence t : j G i G j y 22 satisfies the preceding conditions,
Ž . This establishes the key inductive step, namely, that conditions 17 and Ž . 18 are inherited by the next term t in the sequence. Since the initial j Ä X Ž . 4 sequence t , n : 1 F j F 22 satisfies these conditions, it follows that the j Ä X Ž . 4 whole sequence t , n : 1 F j F ϱ satisfies them. Ž . An analogous argument shows that this sequence also satisfies 10 whenever is sufficiently close to U and 1rn is sufficiently small. Since the length of the stages at least doubles every two stages. No limit point of such a sequence is a Nash equilibrium of the game, and hence it does not have the fictitious play property. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
MODIFICATIONS OF FICTITIOUS PLAY
The above result does not imply that fictitious play is a poor learning rule for all games; as was mentioned at the outset, fictitious play does converge to equilibrium in a variety of interesting cases. Theorem 2 does show, however, that fictitious play has its limitations as a procedure for learning coordination games. This leads to the question of whether a simple variant of fictitious play might get around the difficulty. The variants considered in the literature generally have the feature that best replies to the historical distribution of play are perturbed in some way, andror the historical distribution is truncated or exponentially smoothed. A combination of these features can indeed guarantee convergence in coordination games. Suppose, for example, that the distribution to which players react is truncated to the most recent m plays of the game, but that players have incomplete information about this distribution. In particular, Ž . let each player draw a random sample of size s without replacement from the last m plays, where the draws are independent among players, and assume that each chooses a best reply to the empirical frequency distribution in his sample. When s -m, this amounts to a perturbed best reply process with finite memory. It can be shown that, if information srm is Ž . sufficiently incomplete in particular, if srm F 1r2 , then the process Ž converges with probability one to a coordination equilibrium Young, 1993 , . Theorem 1 .
Similar results obtain under other kinds of stochastic perturbation. Suppose, for example, that there is some systematic ''error'' in the players' responses. Let ␦ be a small positive number. Suppose that with probability 1 y ␦ a given agent chooses a best reply to the frequency distribution of the other side's actions in a random sample drawn from the truncated history, but with probability ␦ she chooses a strategy at random. The probabilities of these events are independent for the two agents. One then obtains a Markov process P ␦ on the finite state space H consisting of all truncated histories of play. This process is ergodic because there is a positive probability of moving from any state to any other in m periods or less. It can be shown that, for all sufficiently small ␦ , the players play a coordination equilibrium with near certainty over the long run. More precisely, given the process P ␦ , let ␦ be the long-run probability that the j Ž . jth coordination equilibrium x , x is played in any given period t as j j t ª ϱ. This probability exists because the process is aperiodic and ergodic. It can be shown that, given any ) 0, Ý ␦ G 1 y for all suffijs1, n j Ž .Ž Ž . ciently small ␦ Young, 1993 . Kandori et al. 1993 prove a similar result . for symmetric 2 = 2 coordination games. In other words, the probability is at least 1 y that over the long run the players coordinate at any given time. Furthermore, in a generic coordination game, the players coordinate almost all of the time on exactly one of the coordination equilibria when the noise ␦ is small.
When there are small perturbations and the history is not truncated, considerably less is known. However, models of this type have been analyzed for 2 = 2 games by various authors, including Fudenberg and Ž . Ž . Ž . Kreps 1993 , Kaniovski and Young 1995 , and Benaım and Hirsch 1996 . The essence of the story is that, when a 2 = 2 game has a unique equilibrium, the process converges to a neighborhood of it with probability Ž one. When the 2 = 2 game is one of coordination i.e., it has two pure . equilibria and one mixed equilibrium , the process converges with probability one to a neighborhood of the coordination equilibria and with probability zero to the mixed one. It seems unlikely, however, that the latter result extends to general coordination games. We conjecture, in fact, that perturbed versions of fictitious play that rely on the full, undiscounted Ž . history as in the model considered by Kaniovski and Young will not converge to equilibrium in the merry-go-round game, and hence that the example is robust in this sense, too. ACKNOWLEDGMENT Peyton Young's research was supported by National Science Foundation grant SBR-9601743.
